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minant Parties, Economic Trends ~~d West European Election Behavior 
f-{ G. PETER WALLACH 
c~ntral Connecticut State University 
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e· The Central Connecticut State University Foundation, Ekkehard 
~;chfmann and the staff of the Zentralarchiv Juer Empirische 
· ozia/forschung at the Univerrsity of Cologne, and the Mellon Foundation 
and Yale University Jor providing me with a Mellon Visiting Faculty 
Fellowship at Yale. 
Previous versions of this research were presented at the 1979 APSA 
meetings, and in a report of the Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialjorschung. 
Analysis of comparative voting trends generally focuses on ideological 
waves,' electoral adjustments to new issues, 2 reaction to incumbent parties, 3 
or economic manipulation.• But since the first two causes have failed to 
prove determinant, most attention is now directed to either of two ap-
proaches: the incumbency factors identified in The American Voters or the 
financially oriented research of Tufte, 6 and others. 
These two perspectives, combined with empirical data from West 
European elections of the 1950s to the 1970s, 1 provide the foundation for 
this article; indicating that in cross-national voting analysis questions of 
ideology, candidate personality, and party program are less important that 
the identification of dominant parties and the effect of international 
economic trends on those parties. The fortunes of secondary parties, 
however, are determined by factors that diverge significantly from those af-
fecting dominant parties. 1 
Dominant Parties 
The dominant parties, that are the subject of this article, are those par-
ties that are most consistent in winning a plurality of the vote for national 
parliaments. In Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and 
witzerland, they have clearly been the first party for the most recent quarter 
century. In Austria, Britain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany 
they are the parties that have most consistently held power between 1950 
and 1970. Though occasionally out of power, they usually rule alone or 
prevail over government coalitions, and they have never been reduced to 
less than second place. From I 950 to 1970 they each received between 30 
and 51 percent of the vote in each election, and with few exceptions they 
continue to do so. 9 
Only Finland, of the western European nations with continuous con-
titutions since 1950, lacks such a party. Elsewhere the prevalence of a 
dominant party is itself notable: it signifies both continuity and the iden-
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tification of authority with a single unit. It also facilitates compa rative . 
vestigation of the effects of incumbency or dominance. in. 
The most obvious observation is that Europe is not domi nate d by on 
ideological stance; for the leading parties in Scandinavian natio ns and i e 
Switzerland are Socialist or Labour, while in the other continenta l countri n 
they are "conservative" or Catholic." es 
The Trends 
Except in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland these dominant 
parties have had similar electoral histories during the third quarter of the 
century. At the end of the fifties, and again from 1965 to 1971 each increased 
its portion of electoral support over that of the previous electi on s. Frorn 
1959 to 1968, and also in the early seventies they all suffere d noticeable 
losses. In addition, of the nine dominant parties, only the Swedish Socia) 
Democrats and the Austrian People's Party did not lose a port ion of their 
overall share of the electorate during the sixties. 
That these are correlative trends is evident in the na ture of the 
similarities, the timing, and the fact that election by election surg_es do not 
occur withi n any of the downward or upward movements. The trends can-
not be ascribe d to pendulum movements since each dominant party's direc-
tion continues even where there are two or more elections in a period of 
downwardness or upwardness: thus substantiating the Rose and Unwin 
observation negating assumptions about pendulum tendencies. 10 
The logic of significance factors also highlights the relationships , 
though strict application of statistical techniques is limited by the small 
number of nations considered. For the trends of the dominant parties cor-
relate closely while the trends of parties in the excepted nations and most of 
the secondary parties exhibit singular patterns that do not cor relate with 
each other. 
Evident in the graphs is that the peaks of proportional support occur 
between 1954 and 1960, and again (though at a lesser level) from 1965 to 
1971, and there are troughs at the beginning of both decades. Table 1 il-
lustrates this with extrapolations of the proportions of increa ses and 
decreases which ascribe proportional changes to interveni ng years. Thi 
provides averages indicating increases in voter support to 1957 , the suc-
ceeding decreases, and the flattened decreases from 1963 to 1968 caused by 
offsetting peaks while overall electoral proportions are rece ding. The 
flatness of these last results is clarified when it is noted the na tions por· 
trayed in the first graph, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom have an average peak of 43.6% in 1969, while the remai nder had an 
average peak in 1966 of 43 .1 OJo. It can also be noted, by using this table, that 
in 1961 only the Austrian Peoples Party increased its share of the electorate . 
By 1965 most dominant parties were increasing their shares, and in 1970 
they are losing again. 11 
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Graph I - SCANDINAVIAN & BRITISH DOMINANT PARTIES 
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1948 41.9 % 48.5% 41.0 0Jo 46.1 OJo 
1949 44.00Jo 43.4 46.8 38.4 45. 70Jo 46.1 31.00Jo 
1950 43.3 39.6% 44.8 45. 1 35.9 45.9 46.0 43 .40Jo 34.5 42.00Jo 
1951 42.6 40.2 46.3 43.5 33.3 46.2 46.0 48.0 38.1 42.7 
1952 42.0 40.7 45.3 41.8 36.3 46.4 46.0 47.6 41.6 43.1 
1953 41.3 41.3 ' 44.4 40.1 39.4 46.7 45.6 47. 1 45.2 43.4 
1954 42.9 40.8 43.4 40.6 42.4 47.1 45.3 46.7 46.4 43.9 
1955 44.4 40.3 45.0 41.0 41.3 47 .5 44.9 49.7 47.7 44.6 
1956 46.0 39.9 46.7 41.5 40.2 47 .9 44.6 49.6 48.9 45.0 
1957 45.4 39.4 48.3 41.9 39.1 48 .3 45.4 49.5 50.2 45.3 
1958 44.8 40.3 47.2 42.4 38.0 47 .9 46.2 49.5 49.0 45.0 
1959 44.2 41.2 46.0 41.6 36.9 47.5 47.0 49.4 47.7 44.6 
VI 1960 44.6 42. 1 44.9 40.7 36.2 47.2 47.8 48.2 46.5 44.2 
1961 45.0 42.0 43.8 39.9 35.5 46.8 47.7 47.0 45.3 43.7 
1962 45.4 42.0 44.8 39.0 34.7 45.9 47.6 45.8 45.9 43.4 
1963 46. 1 41.9 45.8 38.2 34.0 44.9 47.4 44.6 46.4 43.2 
1964 46.8 41.9 46.7 38.4 33.3 44.0 47.3 43.4 47.0 43.2 
1965 47.6 40. 1 47.7 38.6 33.8 43.1 48.0 42.6 47.6 43.2 
1966 48.3 38.3 47.2 38.7 34.3 43.9 48.7 41.9 47.2 43.2 
1967 47.4 36.2 46.7 38.9 34.8 44.8 49.4 43.0 46.8 43.1 
1968 46.5 34. 1 46.2 39.1 35.3 45.6 50.1 44.1 46.5 43.0 
1969 45.6 35.2 45.7 39.0 34.2 46.5 47.7 45.3 46.1 42.8 
1970 44.7 36.2 38.9 33.2 43.7 45.3 46.4 45.7 42.2 
1971 43.1 37.3 38.9 32.1 40.9 45.3 
1972 38.8 31.1 38. 1 44.9 
1973 30.0 35.3 
1974 29.0 
'The 1953 figure is for the September election which sustained the government until 1957. The April election, which is marked on the graph, 
was part of the upward trend. 
' Figures for CDU / CSU. 
' Date taken from Thomas T . Mackie and Richard Rose, The International Almanac of ElecttHal History (London; 1974). 
Recognition of the European-wide trends first suggests a rejection r 
theories on ideological "waves" determining votes across the contineno 
Then it points out that the personnel and organization of political parties r 
specific nations is probably not determinant at the polls, at least not fan 
dominant parties. Thirdly, the analysis of voting trends in pure ly nationa~ 
terms of class differentials, issues, or interest representativeness can b 
diminuated. In the study of election trends, the historical role of the dorni~ 
nant party should first be identified. 
Continental responses, this article indicates, are responses to dominant 
parties, or the results for dominant parties reflect behaviorial react ions to 
other continental trends. No matter what their persuasion, interes t coali-
tion, or experience, dominant parties are parties to be evaluated in their rote 
as rulers. They are a stable force toward or against which voters can easily 
react. No matter what core of voters consistently supports each party the 
dominant party is most susceptible to swings in the independent vote; even 
if the long term direction of its support is stable, increasing, or decreasing, 
short term gains or losses are influenced by factors independent o f its core 
strength. The dominant parties are, after all, the units subjec t to the 
"deviating elections" described so aptly by Campbell, Converse, Miller and 
Stokes; 12 it is from their stable control that there is deviation. When it oc-
curs in European politics, deviation is a continuing expression of historical 
trends: it is a modest extension of the currents that crossed natio nal boun-
daries to threaten regime in 1848 and change them in 1933. Th ough torn 
ballots continue to signify opposition to the system, support lost by the ma-
jor party simply indicates disenchantment with the way the nation is governed. 
Even where "immobilism" has taken hold, partial rejection of the domi-
nant party puts all of the nation's authority structure on notice that there is 
an interest in change. 
But why voters of European nations should simultaneously feel similar 
about authority, or at least the dominant party, is a difficult quest ion . Did 
violence, student dissatisfactions, and union demands enco urage an 
amalgamation of support for established regimes by the voters of the six-
ties? Was Kruschev's saber rattling, appeciation of an economic upsurge, or 
the realization that post war borders should remain stable among the 
reasons these same parties gained support in the late fifties? Were the 
frustrations of "rising expectations" or the instability symbolized by 
American assassinations the cause for the downturn of the early sixties? Or 
are there natural cycles that occur every eight or twelve years? 
Answers cannot be found by looking at the dates the tides cha nge; not 
1959, nor 1962, nor 1969 contain events which sufficiently explain the 
shifts. Nor do the range of years over which peaks and dips occur provide 
conclusive clues. Those believing in the influence of personalities may point 
at discomfort with the hegemony of DeGaulle, trust in the humanit arianism 
of Kennedy, or ambivalence at the election of Nixon as reasons for chang-
ing support for the dominant parties: but none of these explain why the up· 
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ns or downturns last so long, and why they influence elections so divorced 
tllf 'f ' 
rrorn sigm 1cant events. 
political Economic Trends? 
A source for explanatory hints on the causes of these political trends is 
Jl survey data: especially where questions on economic, social, or 
1 
sychological attitudes have been administered, there are suggestions of 
~asual factors. For instance .in the longitudinal materials available at the 
zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozia/Forschung at the University of Co-
logne there are hints . 
The rise and fall in trust of the dominant parties' guidance of the 
economy, the data indicates, correlates with that parties' results at the polls. 
In )961 and 1965 the German researchers asked, What party can best im-
prove the economic situation? ("Welche Partei kann am besten die wirt-
schaftliche Lage Verbessern?"). In 1969 the question was worded similarly 
with the words "and social" added after the word "economic." In 1972 
theY asked, What party is best qualified to hold prices stable? ("Welche 
partei ist best qualifiziert die Preise stabil zu halten?") . The results in 
Graph III are compared to the voting results for the dominant party the 
CDUI CSU. 
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Unfortunately the indicated linkage between economic affa irs, PUbli 
attitudes and election outcomes is limited •by the lack of avai lable colll~ 
parison with surveys in other countries; but it does provide longitudina) 
data for further research into the import of attitudes on econom ic currents 
for results at the polls. 
Where such connections have been investigated previously they have 
generally been considered in terms of national economic policy, rather than 
international trends; for there has been little data for corre lating any 
economic trends with electoral trends. As a result Edward Tufte, in Political 
Control of the Economy 13 only points up how proper ly timed expansionary 
policie have aided incumbent parties, and in an earlier article Assar Lind. 
beck de cribes what cycles of restrictive policy followed by expan sionistic 
policy will be most productive at the polls. 14 However, this hig hly focused 
research provides one of the clues for correlating internationa l economic 
currents and electoral trends. Tufte's suggestion that improve d availability 
of disposable income improves the incumbent parties opportuni ty to win is 
especially valuable. 
Close comparative examination demonstrates that there is a correlation 
between disposable income and the success of dominant parties. But it is not 
a correlations with how much disposable income is avai lable to each 
member of the population, rather it is a correlation with the rate o f growth 
of that disposable income. For instance, if correlated with the German elec-
tions and survey results pictured on Graph I II, we find that the estimated 
per capita increase in national disposable income for West Ger many wa 
243 dollars in the two years preceding the 1965 election when the Christian 
Democrats increased their share of the electorate. But in the following two 
years, when their succe s at the polls shrank, the increase was only 87 
dollars. 
By using one of the few sources for comparable estimates of per capita 
dispo able income, The Yearbook of National Accounts Stat istics, 1970, 
similar data can be established for the other countries in th is study. The 
figures in the handbook indicate the increase in per capita income i the 
following: 
TABLE II: INCREASE IN PER CAPITA DISPOSABLE INC OME 
OF COUNTRY 
Average / yr. 
1960-'63 '63-'65 '65-'67 '67-'68 '68-'69 '60- '69 
Austria $191 $181 $163 $ - 75 $140 $ 83 
Ireland 139 155 103 -17 120 55 
Italy 139 184 84 109 86 
Luxembourg 119 219 79 143 70 
W. Germany 310 243 87 154 242 115 
Denmark 349 410 331 306 155 
Norway 268 286 291 IOI 143 121 
Sweden 425 441 366 151 241 180 
U. K. 204 222 137 129 99 88 
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When combined with the election results and years of elections noted in 
preceding tables and graphs there are indications that: 
our 1. Where, since the previous election or in the previous three years 
there has been an increase in per capita disposable income over that 
of the nations' average for the decade the proportion of the vote 
gained by the ~ominant party increases. 
2. Where the increase has been less than the average increase for the 
decade the dominant party has lost a share of the electorate, with 
the one exception of the 1968 Swedish election. 
3. If in the previous three years the increase in the per capita 
disposable income in any one year has fallen below the average in-
crease for that nation the dominant party has lost ground at the 
polls even through the disposable income may have increased greatly 
in the other two years, with the exception of the Austrian election of 
J 962 and the Norwegian election of 1969. 
Altogether this suggests that insecurity in the continuation of economic 
fortunes leads to reduced confidence for the dominant party. Whether na-
tional policy and economic organization provides for a "trickle down" or a 
"bubble up" changes in per capita disposable income result in changes in 
the perceptions of economic fortunes by a sufficient share of the population 
to affect election results. 
In addition the data on disposable income provides explanations for 
another facet of the unfolding of upsurges and downsurges in election out-
comes as they are graphed at the beginning of this article. For the timing of 
the peaks and valleys on the two graphs do not quite fit with one another. 
The first graph only includes nations in the European Free Trade Associa-
tion which primarily trade with each other and with non-European nations, 
while the second pictures voting returns for nations in the European 
Economic Community plus two nations that primarily trade with the Com-
munity and the United States . The dominant parties in this second group 
are Christian or "conservative" and gained their peaks of support between 
1954 and 1958, and again 1965 and 1968, their low occurred between 1959 
and 1964. The nations on the first graph, on the other hand, are Social 
Democratic or Labour Parties dominating Scandinavia and the Conser-
vative Party of Great Britain, which reached their peaks between 1955 and 
1960, and between 1968 and 1971; their lows are evident between 1964 and 
1968. These offsetting movements, during the sixties, correlate with offset-
ting changes in the rate of increase in per capita disposable income. 
The results could indicate change in international economic trends first 
affects the Economic Community nations and then moves to the others. 
Lag theory, indicating that economic decisions do not necessarily follow 
from immediate economic data, may even show that America, as the engine 
of the western economies, first imprints near trading partners with any 
financial adjustments. This would help support explanation on why support 
for the dominant parties starts with the nations on the main continent of 
Europe and then moves to the others. Obviously lag theory, in so far as elec-
tions are not held immediately after every economic adjustment, makes 
such correlation even more difficult to ascertain. But those who are skep-
tical about the correlation explaining why changes in election trends among 
the outer nations follow those among the inner nations by suggesting that 
this result is purely a function of elections dates need only be reminded the 
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outer nations had eight elections compared to six for the perio d in most 
the nations on the continent. of 
So some interesting research can now follow. Most is related to Wh 
economic trends disperse as they do, and why and when election resuJ Y 
follow such trends. Taken with the research of Rein Taagapera, •s it can f ts 
ther be asked why the electorate places so much economic responsibility Ur. 
a dominant party; for he points out that parties with more than 30% of 1~
11 
vote have even a higher representation in parliament than they deserve be 
direct proportionality; thus their parliamentary power exagge rates th/ 
economic re ponsibility. Moreover there are questions on wheth •r 
economic trends affect other psychological variables within the comrnunit; 
if economic results are linked to general support or oppositi on to "th' 
elite," and to what degree each element of the disposable inco me affectc 
political judgements. s 
The Potential For Secondary Parties 
But there are now secondary parties which took power fro m a number 
of dominant parties during the early seventies . In Austria, Germany, Italy, 
and Luxembourg there has even been a question whether these parties are 
becoming dominant; and in Denmark, Norway, and Swede n the Social 
Democratic Parties lost elections in the seventies to the unite d secondary 
parties of their respective nations. Not only were once dominant parties Jos. 
ing support in the seventies, but all nations now have seco ndary forces 
strong enough to provide a challenge. Dominance is no longe r guaranteed. 
For even nations that did not have clearly competitive parties in the past 
have them now. Moreover those parties are ready to succeed as the bearer~ 
of national power. In Austria, West Germany, and Luxembo urg they were 
victorious throughout the seventies, and they continued to do minate the 
government in succeeding elections. In the remaining nations thei r victorie 
were not substantiated further and may have been more ephe meral. But 
there is evidence some dominant parties of the fifties and sixties, having 
lost support as the seventies approached, were on the verge of being replaced 
as the bearers of authority. 
If authority, along with economic and social leadership, are the qualities 
voters expect of dominant parties, a major role change is demanded 
of secondary parties as they become dominant parties. Havi ng expanded 
their support base by emphasizing the attractiveness of their ideologies, 
gaining voters from other secondary parties, redesigning their policy posi-
tions to attract a greater range of interests and occasionally becoming 
known as the alternate to established dominance; they have not become 
recognized as the parties to beat, the representatives of nationa l goals or the 
party to blame when economic conditions decline. As secon dary parties 
they have been measured with the analytical standards whic h guide tradi-
tional analysis of electoral behavior: expanding their electora l base has been 
the primary goal. 
Though they could win an occasional election while still in a secondary 
category, second parties do not become dominant until they win a number 
of successive elections. For their former victories may be the function of a 
loss of support for dominant authority rather than their own increase in a 
share of the electorate. They may just happen to be close enoug h at the right 
120 
. . for instance, in Austria the Socialist victory of 1959 did not occur 
ll~:~se the party share at the polls increased 1.8%. Even if they had made 
be ains at all they would have won due to the loss of 5% of the vote by the 
no g •nant People's Party. A similar situation occurred in Luxembourg in di:1 Which indicates the effort of a second party is one of challenge rather 
1han ·one of confidence and _experience in governme~t; among voters the 
l ond party is not yet perceived as the normal guardian of power. Of the 
ec nd parties only the Labourites in Great Britain alternated authority 
eco · f h I 1· b' d. 
'th the Conservatives o ten enoug to ay some c aim to emg a ommant 
\1/1 ' 
arty. 16 • • . 
P But other second parties made systematic gams. In West Germany the 
5 cial Democrats increased their share of the electorate by three to four per-
ont in each visit to the polls from 1953 to 1972 until they won the latter 
c~ection with 45.8% of the vote. Their early gains were primarily from the 
\pporters of the minor parties; then, with the 1969 election, it became evi-
~ent they were gaining votes from the dominant Christian Democrats. By 
that time they had shared power for three years in a conscious attempt at 
becoming perceived as legitimate holders of power. After forming the 
governing coalition following the next two elections they established their 
authority, until at least part of the reaction to dominance was reaction to 
chem.17 This is the goal the Communist Party of Italy also sought. It made 
notable increases in most elections from 1968 through the sharp upsurge of 
1976: its aspiration to dominance even sanctified by the support of defect-
ing Christian Democratic politicians who recognized the party success, rather 
than party ideology, would be the impetus to changed votes. But they failed. 
The second parties in Austria and Luxembourg did not have to strive as 
hard to be in a position to win if the support for the established groups 
should decline: they have been in contention throughout the period. And 
after 1968 they reversed fortunes with the once dominant parties. They both 
became first parties and kept their position in two or more elections as a 
re ult of sharp declines in support for the once dominant parties. 
In Scandinavian nations it seemed such changes in dominance would 
take a different form: single parties would not succeed to power. For as 
ubjects of the "Duverger effect" opposition parties acted in a l!nited 
fashion to establish coalitions with the import of single second parties. 18 So 
the four parties to the right of the Socialists in Norway could be evaluated 
as one party even though they compete with each other at the polls. The im-
plied conflict continually raises the question whether these coalitions can ·be 
sustained and whether they will ever be perceived ass single dominant force. 
The test will be in the length of time they hold power and in the way voters 
react to them. But as long as two parties compete equally at the polls, and 
no single party establishes dominance, there will be a question as to which 
party is generally perceived as the authoritative force. One of the com-
plicated evaluations that thus must be made is if the old party of dominance 
has fallen sufficiently to place the symbols of dominance in new hands. 
Only since 1968 has such assessment even been necessary. For only 
since then have all the nations developed second parties, or second party 
coalitions, ready to supplant the once singular authority of the traditional 
dominant parties. It is the first time since World War II that declines in 
dominant party support may be met by a continental shift fo dominance. 
Then the responsibilities for economic trends will be tied to new organizations. 
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The Exceptions 
Even in the nations that have not been part of this ana lysis similar 
realignments have taken place: in France the Communists and Socialist 
have formed a union that is striving to replace the Gau llists, in th; 
Netherlands the Labour Party has won a number of recent elections over 
the once dominant Christian Peoples Party, and in Switzerlan d the Party 
that had winning pluralities without the advantage of governmental 
dominance gained so much increased authority that the opposit ion Parties 
coalesced against it in I 983. Only in Belgium is there an abse nce of indica. 
tions the voting returns will coincide with European patterns. 
All of these nations, however, must be examined indepen dently of re-
cent European trends. Not only are their electoral histories dissimilar 
analysis of their social and party structures commonly separate them fro~ 
assumptions common to other nations. 
France has been influenced by the Gaullist phenomena, which produced 
a new constitution, centered authority in a single leader, and reordered the 
party structure of the nation during a period where rapid socia l, economic 
and institutional changes were also taking affect. As a result the re is increasect 
consensulism among elites, 19 reduced segmentation among voters, 20 and 
higher continuity of identification with political parties by pa rliamentary 
representatives. In time these factors may further French exp ression of 
European trends. But for the immediate past they dictate analy sis that 
recognizes the rapid rise of Gaullist Parties since 1958, an d the read-
justments whi~h followed the leaders demise. Chauvinist and sepa ratist dur-
ing the reign of DeGaulle, analysis of voting returns may, fo r some time, in-
dicate French voters are independent of political attitudes sweeping the rest 
of the continent. 
This is not the situation in Belgium and the Netherlands; segmentation 
still exists there. Illustrative is Seebohm Rowntree's much quote d observa-
tion on 1915 Belgium: 
There is extraordinarily little social intercourse betwee n Catholics 
and Liberals, and practically none between Catholics an d Socialists. 
Politics enter into almost every phase of social activity and philan-
thropic effort, and it is the exception rather than the rule for person 
holding different political opinions to co-operate in any other matter. 
Thus in one town there will be a Catholic, a Liberal, an d a Socialist 
Trade Union, a Catholic, a Liberal, and a Socialist Co-Operative 
bakery, a Catholic, a Liberal, and a Socialist thrift society, each cater-
ing for similar people, but each confining its attention to members of 
its own political party . 21 
In the Netherlands, but not Belgium, there is now evidence thi s condi-
tion is dissipating to the point where the nation can soon be an alysed as 
other western European nations are. 
In Switzerland, however, the changes taking place are diffe rent. They 
are also more difficult to evaluate since Switzerland has been subject to 
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fewer national voting studies than other d~mocratic polities. Th_is is partly 
d e to the highly federal nature of the Swiss government, certamly due to 
:e traditional lack of change in the composition of the executive council, 
L nd, strength of the national elite. Interest in the topic has also been 
~ampened by the lack of change in the electoral results for the three major 
arties over the last quarter century. The Socialists, Radical Democrats, 
~nd Christian Democrats have consistent!~ been within four percentage 
oints of one another and have each consistently earned between 20 and 
~?0/o of the electoral support. Placed in "permanent coalition" until 1983 
no party dominated the executive or was impelled to overthrow it. As a 
result the slight edge at the polls, received by the Socialists, has not provided 
an edge in power: after the recent refusal of the executive council to appoint 
the Social Deomocratic candidate for Chairman, the edge seems to auger a 
change in the Swiss system. In the meantime the most powerful party, due 
10 its connections with the established elite, is probably the Radical 
Democratic: it has been quite effective in coalescing with the Catholic or 
ocial Democratic parties to gain success for critical issues of direct concern 
to supporters. But the lack of survey data and academic studies makes it dif-
ficult to evaluate if the Swiss people perceive the Radical Democrats or any 
other political group as dominant. Should they do so their reaction to the 
Social Democrats may explain their feelings about dominance. The renewed 
interest in that party may then be explained by the criteria used for other 
European parties, the current upsurge in Social Democratic votes being 
imilar to those for former second parties elsewhere. But this could also be 
the result of other factors. 
Survey Data, Population Data, And Further Research 
In the absence of additional information on Switzerland there is 
evidence of the material necessary to corroborate the inferences of this arti-
cle. For surveys on parties as holders of authority have hardly been applied 
in the alpine nation or the rest of Europe. 
The kind of research that is consistently undertaken equates declining 
upport for the system with declining participation at elections or the in-
crease of purposive negation of ballots. 22 It does not provide effective dif-
ferentiation between reduced support for the governors, reduced support 
for the system, and changes in economic conditions. 
Studies on partisanship and voter inclinations at the polls usually raise 
a different series of questions. They emphasize the linkage between social 
background and policy preferences, with party choice. Yet even in their in-
creasing number there are few genuine cross national surveys or 
longitudinal projects that compare attitudes of the same population from 
election to election. 23 In those nations where there is a tradition of election 
urveys there have been questionnaire items on the popularity or capability 
of particular regimes, and on the ability of contending parties to govern. 2• 
But except for the Civic Culture project 2 ' few surveys test respondents at-
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titudes toward authority or their association of the dominant party With 
authoritative roles. Were such issues raised a number of questions could b 
answered: ls dominance and authority an issue by which vote rs evaluate 
parties and make voting decisions? Which portions of the pop ulation take 
these factors into account? Do different portions of the pop ulati on accoune 
for such factors at different elections? When do compone nts such ~ 
governmental inability to maintain order, the threat of externa l or internal 
disruptions, or economic expectations underlie cross national reactions to 
dominant parties? Why do these reactions concide across natio nal bound. 
aries)? 
Evidence for some of the answers can be found in two kinds of 
literature, that on persistence and change in party fortunes, and the work on 
the rise of second parties. 
The most traditional assumption of these studies is that the continuity 
of major parties is due to the established social divisions in a po lity and the 
historical role of the parties in being identified with those divisions_ 2, 
Analysis based on this assumption concludes that the pro babl e party 
membership and voting decisions of individuals can be ascertained by 
knowing his or her occupation, ethnic, and religious identity, and family 
background. 21 Expansion of party fortunes, this infers, will occ ur from an 
extension of the franchise, recruitment of interests not previous ly commit-
ted to the party, or a restructured and changed salience in interest at-
tachments. In fact, these are methods secondary parties seem to have used 
aptly: Liberal and Labour Parties in Great Britain have gaine d from voting 
reform acts, the German Social Democrats purposely change d their plat-
form in 1959 to attract middle class and professional voters, and increased 
urbanism seemingly reduced rural influences on voters and th us aided the 
turn of the century Democrats in the United States. 
But recent studies indicate the assumption, and applicab le methods, 
overlook some explanatory characteristics. Those investigato rs concen-
trating on the continuity in the support of major parties find that where 
cleavages change and voters acquire new occupations there are only limited 
adj ustments in party identification. Where parties are well orga nized, Rose 
and Urwin wrote in 1970, the fluctuations in their support are minor even if 
other social divisions are varying and complex. 28 Four years later Rose added 
that heterogeneity can define a party as well as identification with particular 
interests can. 29 This has led to the 1977 ana lysis by Zucke rman and 
Lichbach that, once established, party identification rather tha n interest 
association determines voting behavior. 30 Thus how a person first identifies 
with a party, rather than what groups support the unit, is emphasized; 
leading to generational descriptions of party fortunes. By joi ning census 
data to voting results, in their article, "Stability and Change in European 
Electorates," Lichbach and Zuckerman conclude that once a party 
dominates an age category it will continue to be the choice of tho se in the 
generation as they become older; as a result a party will dominate the elec-
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al scene as long as the generations in which it has sufficient strength 
10
: ail at the polls. But if a younger generation aligns with a second party 
p~ re is a possibility the once dominant party will succumb as that genera-
1. en becomes a larger share of the electorate. 3 ' The authors thus explain the 
u~ilitY of the German Social Democrats and Italian Communists to threaten 
~ the eventies. They also provide reasons why formerly dominant parties 
1
~roughout Europe declined in the seventie : it is the period post war babies 
~ecame a major portion of the electorate. 
But generational, along with organizational, justifications for long 
rerm trends do not apply to short term variations. These surges and declines 
in dominant party support between 1950 and 1970 seem to have taken place 
while average support of the parties remained steady. 32 If we assume the 
continuity rests on a bedrock of generational or intere t group support we 
till must ask if variations come from those with weak allegiances to 
dominant units. After all, the range of fluctuation is only 5% of the voters 
for the dominant parties on the land mass of Europe, and less than 9% of 
tho e in the other five nations. Since these changes do not relate to varia-
tion in the proportion of voters going to the polls, or to the proportion 
negating ballots, it is worth concentrating on dominant parties. 
The questions to be asked are: Who are the voters of "weak 
allegiance," the voters who respond to economic factors? In light of recent 
re earch on the correlation between economic policy and electoral results 33 
when do international economic activities affect voting and when can 
domestic policies have an effect? What is the resulting interdependence of 
incumbent regimes? 
Answering clues can be found in a number of sources. For instance 
analysis of West German voting returns, district by district, for the period 
of thi study indicates that the greatest frustration in Christian Democratic 
upport, generally reflecting the national rises and declines, took place in 
the north German, non-Catholic, urban centers; with every district in Ham-
burg displaying it. Similar fluctuation in support can be found in Swedish 
urban centers. So one can ask, are these the groups most susceptible to 
economic trends? 
Two additional insights are contained in the classic American studies, 
Voting and The American Voter. The first is that those unaware of the 
ocio-political allegiances of persons with whom they associate are most 
likely to have weak party attachments. 34 The second ascribes such behavior 
to young voters who have not developed stronger loyalties. 35 Applying such 
conclusions to a European nation, David Butler and Donald Stokes arrived 
ar three classifications of reasons for electoral change; the first is associa-
tional, the second is generational, and the third is tied to the information 
and perceptions they have on issues and leaders. This means, in terms of 
thi paper, that perception on issues and leaders is really in terms of the 
perception individual voters have on their economic future when judging 
dominant parties. 
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Conclusion 
When these various factors are placed in a mode l that repre sents th 
findings of this presentation they indicate that: e 
I . Where the nation has a dominant party the fluctuations in that Part , 
fortunes at the po lls is primari ly determine d by fluctuatio ns in internatio y s 
econo mic trends; an d the man ner in which these fluctuations aff ect chan nal 
in per capita disposa ble income. (See p. 118 for detail.) &es 
2. Second parties are most like ly to be victorious if they are withi 
st riking distance of the percentages for the dominant party and if the dorn~ 
inant party is turn ing downward in the share of the electorate it receives. 
3. The primary measures of ana lysis for secondary part ies are the 
traditional ones of national events, ideology, party orga nization, anct 
leaders hip. 
4. Secondary parties can become dominant parties if the y gain suffj. 
cient voters over a per iod of generational change to have the base of support 
for a challenge to primary parties. 
5. At the point when they become dominant parties the fluctuations in 
the fortu nes of recently second parties will become more corre lated with the 
economic fort unes of their weaker supporters than of the tra ditional force 
that have affected their rise. 
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